

Memory, truth and the past

What makes it true that S remembers that p? According to some views, a present representation is a token of memory if there is an event in the past that is the (partial) cause of the present representation. Granting this view about memory and causality, and the understanding of causality as a relationship between contiguous events, my aim in this talk is to discuss the ontology of memory truth-makers. My point is that since any relationship between events require duration, and presentism is incompatible with a time that exists beyond the ontological present (which is very different from the specious present, because it has no duration), the ontology of a presentist philosopher can't explain memory causation. So, we have to look for other theories of time as explanations of memory causation. I propose that parcimony issues (Ockham's razor) give us reason to choose B-theory of time.

César Schirmer dos Santos
Federal University of Santa Maria, Brazil